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Abstract 
This paper addresses the issue of competition in dual banking markets by analyzing the 
determinants of deposit rates in Islamic and conventional banks. Using a sample of 20 countries 
with dual banking systems over the 2000-2014 period, our results show significant differences in 
the drivers of Islamic and conventional banks' pricing behavior. Conventional banks with stronger 
market power set lower deposit rates but market power is not significant for Islamic banks. In 
predominantly Muslim environments, conventional banks set higher deposit rates and further 
higher when their market power is lower. Whereas conventional banks are influenced by the 
competitiveness of Islamic banks, Islamic banks are only affected by their peers in predominantly 
Muslim countries.  Our findings have important implications regarding competition and bank 
stability in dual banking markets. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Islamic banking has substantially grown since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. 
Islamic banking assets grew at an annual rate of 17.6% between 2009 and 2012 and are expected 
to grow at almost 20% per year until 2018 (The Economist, 2014). Islamic banks' total assets have 
reached US$ 1.9 trillion in 2014 (Hussain and Turk-Ariss, 2015) and are expected to rise to US$2.6 
trillion by 2017 (The Economist, 2013). While Islamic finance accounts for a relatively small 
fraction of global banking assets (less than 2%), it has sharply increased its penetration in several 
countries and exceeds the threshold of 15%1 of total banking system assets in at least 10 countries 
(Iran and Sudan with a full-fledged Islamic financial sector, Bangladesh, Brunei, Kuwait, 
Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) (Islamic Financial Service 
Board, 2015). Moreover, Islamic finance has expanded beyond Muslim countries, reaching Europe 
and Sub-Saharan regions. Islamic banks are present in Denmark, France, South Africa and the 
United Kingdom among others. How Islamic and conventional banks compete in such growing 
dual markets remains an insufficiently documented issue. In this work, we investigate how bank 
deposit rates are influenced by the concomitant presence of Islamic and conventional banks in an 
increasing number of countries.    
The development of Islamic banking has led to an important literature investigating the 
potential differences between Islamic and Conventional banks in terms of profitability, risk, 
business models, market structure and competition (see Abedifar et al. (2015) for a survey). 
Nevertheless, despite the growing presence of dual banking markets, where Islamic and 
conventional banks operate alongside, there is a scarce literature on the impact of dual banking 
market structure on Islamic and conventional banks' behavior. Moreover, the results of such studies 
are often mixed. While Turk-Ariss (2010b) finds that Islamic banks are less competitive than their 
conventional counterparts, Weill (2011) does not find significant market power differences 
between both types of banks, in contradiction with the view that Islamic banks may benefit from 
captive customers. Other papers look at the macroeconomic and social implications of further 
penetration of Islamic banks in the financial system as a whole. Gheeraert (2014) shows that the 
presence of Islamic banking in Muslim countries can boost banking sector development. Abedifar 
                                                     
1 The Islamic Financial Stability Board (IFSB) considers the Islamic financial sector as systemically important when 
the total Islamic banking assets account for more than 15% of the total domestic banking sector assets. 
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et al. (2016) highlight a positive impact of the market share of Islamic banks on financial deepening 
and economic welfare. They also find a positive relationship between the presence of large Islamic 
banks and the efficiency of conventional banks in predominantly Muslim countries. Čihák and 
Hesse (2010) further highlight that a higher market share of Islamic banks does not alter the 
soundness of the other banks in a given country, suggesting that both types of banks could compete 
on the same market without jeopardizing financial stability.  
In this work, we question how bank competition in dual markets affects the deposit rate 
setting behavior of Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs), an issue which is of great 
importance from both a market structure perspective and a financial stability perspective. Focusing 
on differences in deposit rate setting in dual markets is of particular interest due to the specific 
nature of Islamic banks’ depositors. Islamic banks follow the Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) 
principle. Transposed to banks this principle implies that profits and losses have to be shared 
between the borrowers and the bank and then between the bank and the depositors. Hence, the 
bank-depositor relationship in Islamic banking is not debt-based as in conventional banks. Islamic 
depositors are considered as “quasi-shareholder” and participate in bank funding through equity-
based contracts, where Islamic depositors act as a source of funds and banks as a fund manager. 
Islamic depositors cannot claim a fixed rate of return on their deposits, a rate which will in fact 
depend on the bank's actual ex post profit. While Islamic banks and conventional banks are 
expected to set their deposit rates differently, empirical research does not report significant 
differences in their pricing behavior. Chong and Liu (2009) and Ito (2013) provide strong evidence 
that the deposit rates of Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia are closely pegged. 
Investigating the deposit rates of conventional and Islamic banks in Malaysia and Turkey, Charap 
and Cevik (2011) show that conventional banks' deposit rates and PLS returns are cointegrated. 
Moreover, the authors find that conventional banks' deposit rates Granger cause returns on PLS 
accounts. Saraç and Zeren (2014) confirm such results and highlight a strong dependency between 
the deposit rates of Islamic and conventional banks in Turkey. Moreover, they also find evidence 
of bi-directional causality thereby highlighting more complex interactions between both types of 
banks than in earlier studies. While these papers provide statistical evidence of a co-evolution of 
deposit rates of Islamic and conventional banks, they do not investigate the determinants of deposit 
rates per se and to what extent they actually differ between both types of banks.  
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For the purpose of our study, we consider a sample of 98 Islamic and 386 conventional 
banks from 20 Muslim and non-Muslim countries where Islamic and conventional banks operate 
alongside. We first examine the determinants of deposit rates for each type of banks (IBs and CBs) 
with a specific focus on the role played by market power. We analyze how both types of banks set 
deposit rates depending on the degree of their market power in possibly segmented markets i.e. 
where IBs and CBs compete for different depositors or in integrated markets i.e. where IBs and 
CBs compete for the same depositors. On the one hand, one might argue that both types of banks 
do not compete with each other and that a depositor switching from a depository institution is more 
likely to go to a similar type of depository institution (Adams et al., 2007; Cohen and Mazzeo, 
2016). In theory, the equity-based deposit accounts offered by Islamic banks should be very 
different from the debt-based deposit accounts of conventional banks. Moreover, Muslims are 
known to be reluctant to use conventional banks financial products which are not Sharia-compliant 
(Abedifar et al., 2016; Beck et al., 2013). In a segmented market, banks should be only influenced 
by the market conditions of their own segment.  On the other hand, because some studies find that 
IBs and CBs deposit rates are closely pegged, one might consider that IBs and CBs compete in 
integrated markets with the same depositors. Nevertheless, it could also be argued that while 
religiosity might prevent depositors from Islamic banks to switch to conventional banks, Islamic 
banks could well attract depositors of conventional banks if they offer higher expected returns. We 
hence also examine the case of a one way/asymmetric competition where CBs are influenced by 
IBs but not the other way round. In such a situation, conventional banks would be competing with 
both categories of banks, conventional and Islamic banks. We further investigate how Islamic and 
conventional banks react to stronger presence of Islamic banks and Muslim population. While 
these factors might not influence bank behavior in segmented markets, the behavior of both Islamic 
and conventional banks can be influenced by the importance of Muslim population and the 
presence of Islamic banks.   
Our findings reveal notable differences in the drivers of deposit rates of Islamic banks and 
conventional banks. As expected, conventional banks with stronger market power set lower 
deposit rates but market power is not effective for Islamic banks. Moreover, conventional banks 
are influenced by the market conditions prevailing on the Islamic segment whereas Islamic banks 
are indifferent to the market structure of the conventional segment. We also find that stronger 
presence of Islamic banks and higher share of Islamic population are associated with higher deposit 
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rates for conventional banks. Moreover, in countries with either a strong presence of Islamic banks 
or a high proportion of Muslim population, conventional banks set higher deposit rates which are 
even higher for the least competitive ones. Our results support previous findings (Abedifar et al., 
2016; Baele et al., 2014; Farook et al., 2012)  indicating that religious beliefs matter in dual markets 
and that they may well shape economic behavior. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, our paper complements the existing 
literature on bank market structure. For instance, following the deregulation process which 
occurred during the 2000s in the U.S., numerous studies have investigated how U.S. banks of 
different type, size or scope compete together. Hannan and Prager (2004) highlight differences, in 
deposit price behavior, between multimarket and single market banks, with significantly lower 
deposit rates at multi-market banks. Moreover, they also highlight a strong influence of both local 
market concentration and presence of multimarket banks on the pricing behavior of single-market 
banks. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate how Islamic and 
conventional banks compete in dual markets. We show that even though prior literature has 
highlighted that Islamic banks mimic conventional banks when they set their interest rates, the 
determinants of such rates are very different. Second, this paper also contributes to the debate on 
financial stability in dual markets. Increased competition can be detrimental for financial stability 
and among others, Hellman et al. (2000) theoretically show that deposit-rate ceilings can be 
necessary to prevent banks from competing through inefficiently high deposit rates possibly 
leading to destructive competition. 
The extent to which Islamic banking development leads to more or less financial stability 
remains an open question. On the one hand, some papers highlight the benefits of Islamic banking 
development for the stability of the financial system through lower default rates on small business 
Islamic loans (Baele et al., 2014), better asset quality and capitalization (Beck et al., 2013), lower 
default risk of small Islamic banks (Abedifar et al., 2013; Čihák and Hesse, 2010), more counter-
cyclical behavior of Islamic banks in the loan market (Ibrahim, 2016) or lower failure rate (Pappas 
et al., 2014). On the other hand, other papers find large Islamic banks to be less stable (Čihák and 
Hesse, 2010) and less diversified and less hedged (Beck et al., 2013) than large conventional banks 
highlighting potential instability sources. By providing evidence that conventional banks set higher 
rates to attract depositors in reaction to higher competitiveness of the Islamic segment, our paper 
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highlights potential detrimental effects of competition, in terms of financial stability, in dual 
markets.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data, the methodology, 
and the descriptive statistics of our variables. Section 3 reports the empirical results and section 4 
provides some further investigations and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Method and data 
 
2.1. Econometric model 
In order to investigate the determinants of deposit rates of Islamic and conventional banks, 
we adopt the following econometric specification: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
  
where the i, j and t subscripts refer to the individual bank, country and time dimensions 
respectively. αi and αt are respectively the individual/bank effects and time-specific effects. 
Deposit rate is our dependent variable. We calculate for each Islamic and conventional 
bank the implicit deposit rate by considering the ratio of total interest expense on customer deposits 
to total customer deposits2. This proxy has been widely used in the literature to analyze deposit 
rate setting behavior (Hannan and Prager, 2004; Rosen, 2007). It is also the proxy which is 
commonly used in the deposit insurance and market discipline literature (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2004; Hori et al., 2009; Imai, 2006; Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Murata and 
Hori, 2006). In line with the structure-performance hypothesis, a substantial literature documents 
that banks set a lower deposit rate in a more concentrated market (Berger and Hannan, 1989; 
Hannan and Berger, 1991; Nys et al., 2015; Rosen, 2007). Furthermore, we expect banks with 
higher market power to set a lower deposit rate. 
To measure market power, we use the Lerner index (Lerner) commonly used in the bank 
competition literature (Berger et al., 2009; Love and Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, 2015; Turk-
                                                     
2 For Islamic banks, the term “deposit return” might be more appropriate than “deposit rate” because Islamic banks 
do not pay interests to their depositors (see Farook et al. (2012)). However, in the rest of the paper, we use the term 
“deposit rate” for both Islamic and conventional banks. 
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Ariss, 2010b; Weill, 2011). The Lerner index is defined as the markup pricing of banking products 
over marginal cost. We follow previous literature (Berger et al., 2009; Love and Maria Soledad 
Martinez-Peria, 2015; Turk-Ariss, 2010b; Weill, 2011) and use a three input cost function 
specification to estimate marginal cost (See Appendix A for a more detailed presentation of the 
computation of the Lerner index).  
The coefficient β1 is expected to be negative, indicating that banks with lower market power 
will set higher rates to attract depositors. 
  In order to measure the degree of competition at the country level, we construct the 
following three country-level Lerner indexes: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝐼𝐵,𝑗,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐶𝐵𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝐵𝑖,𝐶𝐵,𝑗,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
LernerIBjt and LernerCBjt are computed as the weighted average of the individual Lerner 
indexes of respectively, the Islamic banks and the conventional banks operating in country j at 
time t. These two indexes (LernerIBjt and LernerCBjt) measure the degree of competition in the 
Islamic and conventional banking segments respectively. We also compute a measure of 
competition at the country-industry level, LernerMKTjt, as the weighted average of the individual 
Lerner indexes of all banks (both Islamic and conventional banks) operating in country j at time t. 
The latter measures the degree of market competition for the whole banking market (including 
both IB and CB banks). Whereas some authors rely on an simple unweighted average of individual 
Lerner indexes (Love and Martinez-Peria, 2015), we follow Leon (2015) and use a weighted 
average to take into account the relative market share of each Islamic or conventional bank either 
in their own market segment (IB or CB) or in the whole market (IB and CB). 
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As highlighted by previous studies on Islamic banking, religious beliefs might have a 
significant influence on individual decisions, leading Muslim consumers to avoid banking 
products which are not Sharia-compliant and stay away from conventional banks (Kumru and 
Sarntisart, 2016). Beck et al. (2013) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al., (2013) find evidence that Muslims 
are less willing than non-Muslims to own formal accounts or to save their money at a formal 
financial institution. Islamic depositors might also be more loyal towards Islamic banks (Abedifar 
et al., 2016). In countries with a stronger Islamic presence, we expect that conventional banks will 
face more difficulties to attract consumers, especially the religious ones. Moreover, this effect 
might be stronger for banks having a lower market power. In order to investigate the impact of 
stronger Islamic presence (Islamic presencej) on the deposit rate/competition nexus, we extend our 
baseline specification as follows:  
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                           (2) 
 
 
where Islamic presence is either (HighMPOPj) or (HighShareIBjt).  
We use two different measures to capture the extent of Islamic presence. We follow 
Abedifar et al. (2016) and use the proportion of Muslim population in country j (MPOPj). We also 
use the market share of Islamic banks in country j at time t (ShareIBjt) to investigate whether 
differences in Islamic bank presence might impact Islamic and conventional banks’ deposit rate 
setting behavior. We construct two dummy variables (HighMPOPj and HighShareIBjt) that take 
the value of one if the share of Muslim population in country j (MPOPj) and the market share of 
Islamic banks in country j at time t (ShareIBjt) respectively are above the sample mean and zero 
otherwise. 
The impact of Lerner on the deposit rate is given by (β1) in countries with a low level of 
Islamic presence and by (β1+β3) in countries with a high level of Islamic presence. Moreover, we 
also compute the impact of Islamic presence on deposit rate. Computed for different values of the 
Lerner index, this effect is given by (β2+β3*Lernerith) where Lernerith is the value of the Lerner 
index at either the 25th, the 50th or the 75th percentile.  
We then consider which behavior would be consistent in either segmented or integrated 
market as well as markets with asymmetric competition. In segmented markets, conventional and 
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Islamic banks would compete in separate markets for distinct consumers. Islamic banks would 
presumably set deposit rates according to the PLS principle, regardless of the importance of 
Muslim population or of the market share of Islamic banks in the country. Conventional banks 
behavior should not be altered by stronger presence of Islamic population, as conventional banks 
do not expect to attract this type of customers.   
 On the contrary, in integrated markets, where Islamic and conventional banks compete 
alongside for the same consumers, a higher percentage of Muslim population may lead Islamic 
and conventional banks to set higher deposit rates (β2 positive and significant)3. Moreover, in 
countries where the market share of Islamic banks is relatively high, it might be more difficult for 
conventional banks to attract depositors, leading them to increase their deposit rate. Whether 
Islamic banks set higher/lower rates or even actually react in such an environment is unclear. 
Moreover, we expect the impact of stronger Islamic presence to be stronger for banks having lower 
market power (β3 negative). In order to attract depositors in more religious environments or in 
countries with a stronger presence of Islamic banks, low market power banks will need to set 
higher deposit rates. Eventually, in presence of asymmetric competition, Islamic banks would be 
insensitive to conventional banks' market power but the opposite would not be true. To prevent 
customers from fleeing to Islamic banks, in some circumstances conventional banks might need 
to adjust their deposit rates upwards (β3 negative).  
We also control for a large set of bank-level (Xit) characteristics. These variables are 
included with a one-year lag. We use the bank’s return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for the PLS 
principle. Indeed, depositors in Islamic banks are investment account holders and they are 
considered as bank “quasi-shareholders”. Hence, we expect a positive correlation between the 
return on equity and the return provided to Islamic banks’ investment account holders. For 
conventional banks, ROE might also be considered as a proxy for profitability. We expect higher 
profitability to reduce default risk and hence enable banks to set a lower deposit rate. A higher 
ROE may therefore also be associated with a lower deposit rate (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 
2001). We control for different dimensions of bank risk using the ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets (Liquidity) as a measure of liquidity risk, the ratio of loan loss reserve to total loan (LLR) to 
                                                     
3 If Islamic and conventional banks are not viewed as very different institutions  (Beck et al., 2013; Charap and Cevik, 
2011; Chong and Liu, 2009; Saraç and Zeren, 2014), Islamic banks are expected to follow conventional banks in 
increasing their deposit rates to attract customers.  
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proxy credit risk and the capital ratio (Equity) to proxy default risk. Highly risky banks are 
expected to increase their deposit rates to attract customers (Acharya and Mora, 2015; Martinez-
Peria and Schmukler, 2001). We also control for bank size using the logarithm of total assets (Size). 
Even though large and small banks might set different rates there's no clear-cut expected 
relationship (Rosen, 2007). Larger banks might offer higher rates to their customers because they 
have better investment options. However, they may also offer lower rates because they have 
alternative sources of funding. Listed banks are also captured by a dummy variable (Listed) which 
takes the value of one is the bank is listed and zero otherwise. Listed banks, which have an easier 
access to market funding, may be less reliant on deposits and may set lower rates than privately-
owned banks (Nys et al., 2015).  
We also include in our regressions a set of country-level variables (Zjt). We control for 
banking market structure using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), computed as the sum of 
the squared values of each bank’s market share (both IBs and CBs) in the overall market. 
Computation of bank market share relies on banks’ deposits. The value of this index lies between 
0 and 1. A greater value of this index indicates a more concentrated market, which may lead banks 
to offer a lower deposit rate (Nys et al., 2015; Rosen, 2007). Finally, we control for macroeconomic 
conditions using the inflation rate (Inflation) and the growth of GDP (GGDP). Table B1 (appendix 
B) provides a description of all the variables used in this study. 
 
[Insert Table B1] 
 
We estimate Equations (1) and (2) on two distinct sub-samples, Islamic banks and 
conventional banks.  Equation 1 is estimated using the fixed effect estimator with standard errors 
clustered at the bank level. For Equation 2, we rely either on the fixed-effect estimator (when 
HighShareIB is used as a proxy of Islamic presence) or on the Hausman-Taylor estimator (when 
HighMPOP is used as a proxy of Islamic presence). Indeed, as the variable HighMPOP is time-
invariant, we cannot use the fixed-effect estimator. While switching to the random effect (RE) 
estimator might allow us to identify all the coefficients of our equations, the Hausman test indicates 
that the RE estimator might be inconsistent. We hence use Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator. The 
HT estimation requires the partition of the variables into endogeneous and exogeneous variables. 
We follow Baltagi (2005), Baltagi et al. (2003), and Bouvatier (2014) and use the the Hausman 
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test (FE vs. HT) for the choice of endogenous variables. We choose the combination which 
maximizes the p-value of the Hausman test (FE vs. HT). 
 
2.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on bank-level and country-level data for a sample of 
Islamic and conventional bank from countries with dual banking systems over the 2000-2014 
period. Our bank-level data come from the Bankscope database. We use consolidated data when 
available and otherwise unconsolidated data. In order to deal with Islamic banking 
misclassification issues in the Bankscope database (Abedifar et al., 2013; Čihák and Hesse, 2010; 
Gheeraert, 2014), we also refer to the World Bank database of Islamic banking4. However, as the 
World Bank database covers not only Islamic commercial banks but also Islamic investment 
banks, we also check each Islamic bank’s website and drop purely Islamic investment banks 
having no customer deposits. We winsorize our main variables at the 1% and 99% level. Our final 
sample includes of 2,869 observations for a set of 98 Islamic and 386 conventional banks from 20 
Muslim and non-Muslim countries5. Table 1 presents some country-level information for our 
sample of countries. 
Our country-level data come from different sources. We collect GDP growth data and 
inflation rates from the World Bank website and the percentage of the Muslim population comes 
from The World Factbook. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of our bank-level variables for the whole sample of 
banks and reports the results of mean tests between IB and CB sub-samples. Islamic banks’ deposit 
rates are significantly lower than those of conventional banks. This finding is in line with the 
results of Aysan et al. (2016) who observe that Turkish Islamic banks pay lower deposit rates than 
their conventional counterparts. Consistent with Weill (2011), we do not find significant 
differences for the Lerner indexes, meaning that, on average, the market power of Islamic banks 
and conventional banks are not different. 
 
                                                     
4 The database is available here: http://go.worldbank.org/AE0U8AYQ20 
5 Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Yemen. 
12 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Conventional banks in our sample are larger (Size) than Islamic banks. Moreover, as 
highlighted in the literature (e.g., Abedifar et al.(2013); Beck et al. (2013)), Islamic banks are 
better capitalized (Equity) than Conventional banks.  
Turning to country-level variables, the average market share of Islamic banks (ShareIB) is 
18.3% and the average value of Muslim population (MPOP) is 76.7%. The mean value of HHI is 
0.19.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
3.1. Baseline regression 
Table 3 displays the estimation results for Equation (1) over our two sub-samples of banks. 
Results are reported in columns (1) to (3) for the IBs sub-sample and in columns (4) to (6) for the 
CBs sub-sample. As the correlation matrixes (Table B2 and B3 in Appendix B) indicate a 
significant correlation between our measure of bank market power (Lerner) and our PLS proxy 
(ROE) on both sub-samples (IBs and CBS), we first introduce Lerner and ROE separately 
(columns (1) and (2) for the IBs sub-sample and columns (4) and (5) for the CBs sub-sample 
respectively). Columns (3) and (6) report the estimation results when simultaneously including 
Lerner and ROE for the IB and CB sub-samples respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Our results show notable differences in the drivers of deposit rates in Islamic and 
conventional banks and specifically regarding the effect of bank market power. While higher 
market power (higher value of Lerner) leads conventional banks to set lower deposit interest rates, 
this variable is not significant for Islamic banks. In other words, contrary to conventional banks, 
Islamic banks, who might benefit from a captive clientele, do not set lower deposit rates when 
gaining market power. This result is consistent with the view that Islamic banks' behavior is shaped 
by the moral obligation to set a fair price to their customers, possibly limiting their willingness to 
set lower prices. This result is also in line with the findings of Mollah and Zaman (2015) and 
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Mollah et al. (2016) who highlight that the governance structure of Islamic banks with the presence 
of a Shari’ah supervisory board might play a significant role in Islamic bank behavior.  
We also find a negative relationship between the deposit rate and liquidity risk for 
conventional banks, indicating that conventional banks set lower deposit rates when they are more 
liquid, although at the 10% significance level only. This result is consistent with previous findings 
(Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Nys et al., 2015). However, we do not find any significant 
impact for Islamic banks. A positive relationship is obtained between the deposit rate and credit 
risk for Islamic banks, indicating that more risky banks set higher rates. Consistent with Nys et al. 
(2015), larger banks and listed banks set a higher deposit rate a result which holds for both Islamic 
and Conventional banks in our sample. As expected, we find a positive and significant effect of 
our PLS proxy (ROE) on the deposit rates of Islamic banks, although at the 10% significance level 
only. Higher return to shareholders leads to an increase in the return provided to depositors. 
Finally, while inflation has a significant impact on deposit rates for conventional banks, regarding 
Islamic banks the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level.  
All in all, while previous studies (e.g. Charap and Cevik (2011), Chong and Liu (2009), 
Saraç and Zeren (2014)) argue that the correlation between deposit rates of conventional and 
Islamic banks indicate that both types of finance do no significantly differ, our results provide 
evidence of significant differences in the way IBs and CBs set their deposit rate.  
 
3.2. Deposit rate, market power, and Islamic presence 
 We further investigate in this section whether the pricing behavior of Islamic and 
conventional banks is altered by the importance of Islamic presence, measured either by the share 
of Muslims in the population or by the market share of Islamic banks. Table 4A presents the 
estimation results of Equation (2) using alternatively HighShareIBjt (columns (1) and (3)) and 
HighMPOPj (columns (2) and (4)) as a measure of Islamic presence. Table 4B provides the impact 
of Lerner when Islamic presence is high (using alternatively HighShareIBjt (columns (1) and (3)) 
and HighMPOPj (columns (2) and (4)) and the impact of Islamic presence (using alternatively 
HighShareIBjt (columns (1) and (3)) and HighMPOPj (columns (2) and (4)) computed at different 
value of Lerner. 
 
[Insert Tables 4A and 4B] 
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Our findings highlight significant differences in the impact of Islamic presence on deposit 
rates for Islamic and conventional banks. While higher market share of Islamic banks leads to an 
increase in deposit rates for both types of banks, higher share of Muslim population only impacts 
conventional banks' pricing behavior. In countries with a predominant Muslim population, 
conventional banks set higher deposit rates than in countries with a lower proportion of Muslim 
population, while Islamic banks' pricing behavior is not impacted. This result suggests that 
conventional banks might face strong difficulties to attract depositors in more religious 
environments. Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term (Lerner*Islamic presence) is 
negative and significant, indicating that the impact of Islamic presence (using both HighShareIBjt 
and HighMPOPj) is stronger for conventional banks with lower market power. In countries with a 
predominant Muslim population or with a strong presence of Islamic banks, conventional banks 
set a higher deposit rate and even higher when their market power is lower.  
Nevertheless, while our findings suggest that stronger market power allows Islamic banks 
to set higher deposit rates in countries where Islamic banks' market share is low (β1 is positive and 
significant), we do not find any significant impact in countries where the market share of Islamic 
banks is high ((β1+β3) is not statistically significant). 
Our results so far suggest significant differences in IBs and CBs pricing behavior. While 
conventional banks set lower deposit rates when gaining market power, we do not observe such a 
behavior for Islamic banks. Moreover, we also highlight that stronger presence of Islamic banks 
or higher proportion of Muslims in the population shapes the relationship between deposit rate and 
market power at conventional banks. In predominantly Islamic environments, where depositors 
are more reluctant to own conventional banks’ financial products which are not Sharia-compliant 
or when Islamic banks are highly present, conventional banks face stronger difficulties to attract 
depositors, strengthening the impact of bank market power on deposit rates.  
 
3.3 Competition in dual banking market 
In this section, we investigate how both types of banks react in terms of deposit rate setting 
depending on the competitiveness either of the whole banking market or of each banking segment 
(Islamic and conventional). We address whether competition occurs in possibly segmented 
markets (where IBs and CBs compete for different depositors), in integrated markets (where IBs 
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and CBs compete for the same depositors) or, in the case of a one way/asymmetric competition 
where CBs are influenced by IBs but not the other way round. We hence alternately replace the 
bank-level measures of market power by our different market-level competition indexes 
(LernerIBjt, LernerCBjt, LernerMKTjt) and re-run the estimations of Equations (1) and (2). The 
results are presented in Tables 5, 6A and 6B. Table 5 reports the impact on IBs and CBs deposit 
rates of competition on the Islamic banking segment (columns (1) and (4)), on the conventional 
segment (columns (2) and (5)) and on the overall banking market (columns (3) and (6)).  
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
Considering either the overall market (LernerMKTjt) or each separated segment 
(LernerIBjt, LernerCBjt), stronger competition does not alter Islamic banks' deposit rate setting 
behavior. On the contrary, we find a significant influence of country-level market competition on 
conventional banks' deposit rate setting. Stronger market-level competition leads conventional 
banks to set higher deposit rates. Moreover, while stronger competition within the conventional 
banks' segment impacts conventional banks pricing behavior, market conditions on the Islamic 
banks segment have no impact at all.  
We further find that the importance of Islamic presence significantly alters the behavior of 
conventional banks. Table 6A reports the results when investigating IBs or CBs' reaction either to 
the competitiveness of their own segment (columns (1) and (2) and (7) and (8) respectively) or to 
the competitiveness of the other segment (columns (3) and (4) and (5) and (6) respectively). Table 
6B provides the impact of our different market-level Lerner indexes when Islamic presence is high 
(using alternately HighShareIBjt (columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)) and HighMPOPj (columns (2), (4), 
(6) and (8)) and the impact of Islamic presence (using alternatively HighShareIBjt (columns (1), 
(3), (5) and (7)) and HighMPOPj (columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)) computed at different values of 
the Lerner index (25th, 50th and 75th percentiles). 
 
[Insert Tables 6A and 6B] 
 
Our results suggest that both Islamic and conventional banks' behavior are impacted by the 
market conditions of their own segment. Conventional banks set higher deposit rates when the 
16 
 
degree of competition in their segment is lower, whatever the share of Muslim population or the 
market share of Islamic banks (column (7) and (8)). However, while the strength of Islamic 
presence does not alter the behavior of conventional banks, it matters for Islamic banks. We find 
evidence of a positive effect of competition on Islamic banks' deposit rates only in countries with 
a predominantly Muslim population (column (2)). We also find a negative impact of competition 
in the CBs’ segment on IBs deposit rates, but only at the 10% level (column (4)). 
Moreover, in countries with either a high share of Muslim population or a strong presence 
of Islamic banks, conventional banks set higher deposit rates when competition in the Islamic 
segment is stronger (columns (5) and (6)). Competitive conditions on the Islamic segment 
influence the pricing behavior of conventional banks but Islamic banks are insensitive to the 
conditions prevailing on the conventional segment (columns (3) and (4)). These results are 
consistent with the possible existence of an asymmetric competition between Islamic and 
conventional banks, which is dependent on the importance of Islamic presence. 
The way that conventional banks set their deposit rate in response to Islamic presence is in 
line with previous papers highlighting the importance of religiosity in dual banking markets 
(Abedifar et al., 2016; Baele et al., 2014; Farook et al., 2012).  
 
4. Further investigations and robustness tests 
 
We address the impact of 2007-2009 financial crisis on deposit rate setting behavior of IBs 
and CBs. We construct a dummy variable Crisis which equals one during the 2007-2009 period 
and zero otherwise. In order to address this issue, we estimate the following equation: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (3) 
 
Our results (Table 7) show that IBs behavior is not impacted by the financial crisis whereas 
CBs set a lower deposit rate during the financial crisis and even lower when their market power is 
weaker. 
 
[Insert Table 7] 
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 We further investigate whether the impact of market competition on deposit rates is altered 
by the degree of competition in the other segment. In order to capture this possible effect, we 
construct two dummy variables, HighLernerIBjt and HighLernerCBjt which take the value of one 
if the value of LernerIBjt and the value of LernerCBjt respectively are above the sample mean and 
zero otherwise. We estimate the following equations: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 + 𝛽2  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐶𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 ∗
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐶𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                           (4) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 + 𝛽2  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 ∗
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                            (5) 
 
The results are provided in Table 8. While the degree of competition in the CBs segment does not 
influence Islamic banks' behavior, CBs deposit rates are significantly impacted by stronger 
competition in the IBs segment. Stronger competition in the CBs segment leads to a higher deposit 
rate, but only in countries where the degree of competition in the IBs segment is high (𝛽3 is positive 
and significant). In other words, stronger competition in the IBs segment leads conventional banks 
to set higher deposit rates.   
 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
As highlighted by the existing literature, market interest rates significantly impact Islamic 
banks' behavior. In contradiction with the interest-free principle, Ergeç and Arslan (2013) find 
evidence of a significant influence of market interest rates on deposit rates of Islamic banks in 
Turkey. Caporale et al. (2016) also highlight a significant impact of interest rate shocks on Islamic 
bank lending even though this effect is weaker than for conventional banks. We hence include in 
our regressions a short term market interest rate (Interest rate). Due to the high correlation between 
Inflation and Interest rate, we drop the variable Inflation when including Interest rate. Short term 
interest rate data are taken from the International Financial Statistics database of the International 
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Monetary Fund6. As highlighted in the existing literature, we find a positive and significant impact 
of market interest rates on deposit rates for both IBs and CBs. We still find conventional banks to 
set higher deposit rates when their market power is lower and even lower in predominantly Islamic 
environment ((β1+β3) is negative and significant) (Tables 9A and 9B). 
 
[Insert Tables 9A and 9B] 
 
We also conduct some robustness tests. We replace the return on equity (ROE) by the return 
on assets (ROA). Our main results remain identical (Tables 10A and 10B).  
 
[Insert Tables 10A and 10B] 
 
Following Rosen (2007) who argues that the presence of ROE in such models may lead to 
endogeneity issues, we also conduct our regressions by using the instrumental variables technique. 
One year lagged ROE is instrumented by two-year lagged ROE, ROE Industry, and market 
development (the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP per capita). The Kleibergen-Paap F-
Statistics indicates that the instruments we use are strong. The non-significant value of the Hansen 
J-Statistics (over-identification test) indicates that our instruments are not correlated with the error 
term. Using IV leaves our main results unchanged (Table 11). 
 
[Insert Table 11] 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
This paper investigates the impact of competition in dual banking markets and focuses on 
differences in deposit rate setting in Islamic and conventional banks. While, in theory, the specific 
nature of deposit accounts at Islamic banks should lead to significant differences compared with 
conventional banks' deposits the literature has so far argued that Islamic and conventional banks 
deposit rates are closely pegged. We show that there are nevertheless notable differences in the 
                                                     
6 Out of the 20 countries of our sample, there are two countries (Sudan and United Arab Emirates) for which short 
term interest rate data are not available over our sample period.  
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determinants of deposit rates in the two types of institutions. Market power measured at the 
individual bank level by the Lerner index is only significant for conventional banks. Moreover, in 
predominantly Muslim countries or in countries with an important presence of Islamic banks, 
conventional banks set higher deposit rates and such rates are even higher for conventional banks 
with relatively lower market power. In such environments, conventional banks presumably face 
stronger difficulties to attract depositors, strengthening thereby the impact of competition. We 
further find that the conventional banks are sensitive to deposit rates offered by Islamic banks, 
while Islamic banks are only influenced by their peers and mostly in predominantly Muslim 
countries.   
 Our findings have important implications for the future of banking in dual markets where 
conventional and Islamic banks operate alongside and specifically in countries where Islamic 
banks are persistently gaining market shares. Moreover, because conventional banks are found to 
significantly react to stronger competition from Islamic banks, bank regulators and supervisors 
should carefully monitor both types of institutions in such dual markets to prevent possibly 
excessive competition from jeopardizing financial stability. 
 
References 
 
Abedifar, P., Ebrahim, S.M., Molyneux, P., Tarazi, A., 2015. Islamic Banking and Finance: Recent 
Empirical Literature and Directions for Future Research. J. Econ. Surv. 29, 637–670. 
doi:10.1111/joes.12113 
Abedifar, P., Hasan, I., Tarazi, A., 2016. Finance-Growth Nexus and Dual-Banking Systems: 
Relative Importance of Islamic Banks. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 1–18. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2614180 
Abedifar, P., Molyneux, P., Tarazi, A., 2013. Risk in Islamic Banking. Rev. Financ. 17, 2035–
2096. doi:10.1093/rof/rfs041 
Adams, R.M., Brevoors, K.P., Kiser, E.K., 2007. Who Competes with Whom? The Case of 
Depository Institutions. J. Ind. Econ. 55, 141–167. 
Aysan, A.F., Disli, M., Duygun, M., Ozturk, H., 2016. Islamic Banks, Deposit Insurance Reform, 
and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Framework. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 1–26. 
doi:10.1007/s10693-016-0248-z 
20 
 
Baele, L., Farooq, M., Ongena, S., 2014. Of religion and redemption: Evidence from default on 
Islamic loans. J. Bank. Financ. 44, 141–159. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.005 
Baltagi, B.H., 2005. Econometric analysis of panel data, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Baltagi, B.H., Bresson, G., Pirotte, A., 2003. Fixed effects, random effects or Hausman–Taylor? 
Econ. Lett. 79, 361–369. doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00007-7 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Merrouche, O., 2013. Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business 
model, efficiency and stability. J. Bank. Financ. 37, 433–447. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.09.016 
Berger, A.N., Hannan, T.H., 1989. Price-Concentration Relationship in Banking. Rev. Econ. Stat. 
71, 291–299. 
Berger, A.N., Klapper, L.F., Turk-Ariss, R., 2009. Bank Competition and Financial Stability. J. 
Financ. Serv. Res. 35, 99–118. doi:10.1007/s10693-008-0050-7 
Bouvatier, V., 2014. Heterogeneous bank regulatory standards and the cross-border supply of 
financial services. Econ. Model. 40, 342–354. doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2014.04.013 
Caporale, G.M., Çatık, A.N., Helmi, M.H., Ali, F.M., Tajik, M., 2016. The Bank Lending Channel 
in a Dual Banking System : Evidence from Malaysia, SSRN Working Paper. 
Charap, J., Cevik, S., 2011. The Behavior of Conventional and Islamic Bank Deposit Returns in 
Malaysia and Turkey. IMF Work. Pap. 11, 1. doi:10.5089/9781455293704.001 
Chong, B.S., Liu, M.-H., 2009. Islamic banking: Interest-free or interest-based? Pacific-Basin 
Financ. J. 17, 125–144. doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2007.12.003 
Čihák, M., Hesse, H., 2010. Islamic Banks and Financial Stability: An Empirical Analysis. J. 
Financ. Serv. Res. 38, 95–113. doi:10.1007/s10693-010-0089-0 
Cohen, A.M., Mazzeo, M.J., 2016. Market Structure and Competition among Retail Depository 
Institutions. Rev. Econ. Stat. 89, 60–74. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Huizinga, H., 2004. Market discipline and deposit insurance. J. Monet. Econ. 
51, 375–399. doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2003.04.001 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Klapper, L.F., Randall, D., 2013. Islamic finance and financial inclusion: 
Measuring use and demand for formal financial services among muslim adults (No. 6642), 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. 
Ergeç, E.H., Arslan, B.G., 2013. Impact of interest rates on Islamic and conventional banks: the 
case of Turkey. Appl. Econ. 45, 2381–2388. doi:10.1080/00036846.2012.665598 
21 
 
Farook, S., Hassan, M.K., Clinch, G., 2012. Profit distribution management by Islamic banks: An 
empirical investigation. Q. Rev. Econ. Financ. 52, 333–347. doi:10.1016/j.qref.2012.04.007 
Gheeraert, L., 2014. Does Islamic finance spur banking sector development? J. Econ. Behav. 
Organ. 103, S4–S20. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.02.013 
Hannan, T.H., Berger, A.N., 1991. The Rigidity of Prices: Evidence from the Banking Industry. 
Am. Econ. Rev. 81, 938–945. 
Hannan, T.H., Prager, R.A., 2004. The competitive implications of multimarket bank branching. 
J. Bank. Financ. 28, 1889–1914. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2003.06.006 
Hori, M., Ito, Y., Murata, K., 2009. Do Depositors Respond Rationally To Bank Risks? Evidence 
From Japanese Banks During Crises. Pacific Econ. Rev. 14, 581–592. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
0106.2009.00470.x 
Hussain, M., Turk-Ariss, R., 2015. An overview of Islamic finance (No. WP/15/120), IMF 
Working Paper. 
Imai, M., 2006. Market discipline and deposit insurance reform in Japan. J. Bank. Financ. 30, 
3433–3452. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.01.009 
Islamic Financial Service Board, 2015. Islamic Financial Service Industry Stability Report. 
Ito, T., 2013. Islamic rates of return and conventional interest rates in the Malaysian deposit 
market. Int. J. Islam. Middle East. Financ. Manag. Vol. 6, pp. 290 – 303. 
doi:10.1108/IMEFM-11-2012-0113 
Kumru, C.S., Sarntisart, S., 2016. Banking for those unwilling to bank: Implications of Islamic 
banking systems. Econ. Model. 54, 1–12. doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2015.12.011 
Leon, F., 2015. Does bank competition alleviate credit constraints in developing countries? J. 
Bank. Financ. 57, 130–142. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.04.005 
Love, I., Martinez-Peria, M.S., 2015. How bank competition affects firms’ access to finance, 
World Bank Economic Review. doi:10.1093/wber/lhu003 
Martinez-Peria, M.P., Schmukler, S.L., 2001. Do depositors punish bank for bad behavior? J. 
Finance 56, 1029–1051. 
Mollah, S., Hassan, M.K., Al Farooque, O., Mobarek, A., 2016. The governance, risk-taking, and 
performance of Islamic banks. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 1–25. doi:10.1007/s10693-016-0245-2 
Mollah, S., Zaman, M., 2015. Shari’ah supervision, corporate governance and performance: 
Conventional vs. Islamic banks. J. Bank. Financ. 58, 418–435. 
22 
 
doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.04.030 
Murata, K., Hori, M., 2006. Do small depositors exit from bad banks? Evidence from small 
financial institutions in Japan. Japanese Econ. Rev. 57, 260–278. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
5876.2006.00363.x 
Nys, E., Tarazi, A., Trinugroho, I., 2015. Political connections, bank deposits, and formal deposit 
insurance. J. Financ. Stab. 19, 83–104. doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2015.01.004 
Rosen, R.J., 2007. Banking market conditions and deposit interest rates. J. Bank. Financ. 31, 3862–
3884. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.02.009 
Saraç, M., Zeren, F., 2014. The dependency of Islamic bank rates on conventional bank interest 
rates: further evidence from Turkey. Appl. Econ. 47, 669–679. 
doi:10.1080/00036846.2014.978076 
Soedarmono, W., Machrouh, F., Tarazi, A., 2011. Bank market power, economic growth and 
financial stability: Evidence from Asian banks. J. Asian Econ. 22, 460–470. 
doi:10.1016/j.asieco.2011.08.003 
The Economist, 2014. Big interest, no interest [WWW Document]. Econ. URL 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21617014-market-islamic-
financial-products-growing-fast-big-interest-no-interest 
The Economist, 2013. A mecca for sukuk [WWW Document]. Econ. URL 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/11/islamic-finance 
Turk-Ariss, R., 2010a. Competitive conditions in Islamic and conventional banking: A global 
perspective. Rev. Financ. Econ. 19, 101–108. doi:10.1016/j.rfe.2010.03.002 
Turk-Ariss, R., 2010b. On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing 
countries. J. Bank. Financ. 34, 765–775. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.09.004 
Weill, L., 2011. Do Islamic Banks Have Greater Market Power? Comp. Econ. Stud. 53, 291–306. 
doi:10.1057/ces.2011.1 
 
 
 
 
  
23 
 
APPENDIX A: Lerner index computation 
 
The Lerner index we compute here is consistent with Berger et al. (2009), Love and 
Martinez-Peria (2015), Turk-Ariss (2010) and Weill (2011). Total cost is estimated using the 
following trans-logarithm cost function:  
ln(TC) = ∝0+∝1 ln(TA) +
1
2
∝2 (ln TA)
2 + ∑ βj
3
j=1
ln(Wj) + ∑ ∑ βjk
3
k=1
3
j=1
ln(Wj) ln(Wk)
+ ∑ γj
3
j=1
ln(TA) ln(Wj) + ε 
(i) 
 
TC denotes total costs (sum of total interest expenses and total non-interest expenses) and 
TA is total assets. We use three input prices: (1) price of labor, W1; price of capital, W2; and price 
of funds, W3. The price of labor is calculated by dividing personnel expenses to total assets. The 
price of capital is computed by calculating the ratio of other operating expenses to total assets. The 
price of funding is the ratio of interest expenses to total customer deposits. After we obtain all the 
coefficients from the cost function, we compute marginal cost by using equation (ii) as follows. 
MC =
TC
TA
(∝1+∝2 ln(TA) + ∑ γj ln (Wj)
3
j=1
) 
 
(ii) 
Lernerit =
Priceit − MCit
Priceit
 (iii) 
After we get all of the coefficients, we compute marginal costs as in equation (ii). Finally, 
the bank level Lerner index can be calculated using equation (iii). The Lerner index summarizes 
the differences between price of product and marginal costs, scaled by price. Price itself is the ratio 
of total revenue (sum of total interest income and total non-interest operating income) to total 
assets. Generally speaking, a higher value of the Lerner index indicates higher market power or 
lower market competition because banks are able to set the price above the marginal cost in less 
competitive markets. The value of the Lerner index ranges between 0 (high market power/lowly 
competitive market) and 1 (low market power/highly competitive market). However, the Lerner 
index can also be negative for inefficient banks (Soedarmono et al., 2011). 
24 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Table B1. Summary of the variable definition 
 Variables description Source 
Bank-level variables  
Deposit rateit The ratio of total interest expense on deposits to consumer deposits. Bankscope 
Lernerit Bank-level Lerner index.  Bankscope 
ROEit The ratio of equity to total assets. Bankscope 
Liquidityit The ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Bankscope 
ROAit The ratio of net income to total assets.  
Equityit The ratio of equity capital to total asset. Bankscope 
Sizeit The logarithm of total assets. Bankscope 
LLRit The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. Bankscope 
Listed A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank is listed and zero otherwise Bankscope 
Country-level variables  
LernerIBjt 
The weighted average of the individual Lerner indexes of Islamic banks in country 
j at time t. 
Bankscope 
LernerCBjt  
The weighted average of the individual Lerner indexes of conventional banks in 
country j at time t. 
Bankscope 
LernerMKTjt  
The weighted average of the individual Lerner indexes of all banks (both Islamic 
and conventional banks) operating in country j at time t. 
Bankscope 
ShareIBjt Market share of Islamic banks (in terms of total deposits) in country j at time t. Bankscope 
HighShareIBjt 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the value of ShareIBjt is above the 
sample mean and zero otherwise. 
Bankscope 
MPOPj Proportion of Muslims in country j. 
The World 
Factbook 
HighMPOPj 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the value of MPOPj  is above the 
sample mean and zero otherwise 
World 
Factbook 
Inflationjt Rate of inflation 
The World 
Bank website. 
GGDPjt GDP growth 
The World 
Bank website. 
HHIjt 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) is a proxy for market concentration in country 
j at date t: 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1⁄ )
2𝑛
𝑖=1 . The value 
ranges between 0 and 1. Higher values indicate that the market is more 
concentrated. 
Bankscope 
Interest ratesjt Short-term interest rate 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
(website of 
IMF) 
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Table B2. Correlation matrix of Islamic banks’ sub-sample 
 
 
Deposit 
rate Lerner LernerIB LernerCB LernerMKT HighShareIB HighMPOP ROE Liquidity LLR Equity Size ROA Listed Inflation HHI GGDP Interest 
Deposit rate 1.000                  
Lerner -0.151 1.000                 
LernerIB -0.117 0.637 1.000                
LernerCB -0.428 0.447 0.586 1.000               
LernerMKT -0.407 0.462 0.635 0.984 1.000              
HighShareIB -0.080 0.116 0.353 0.364 0.342 1.000             
HighMPOP 0.263 0.196 0.475 0.209 0.247 0.214 1.000            
ROE 0.031 0.564 0.444 0.160 0.193 0.072 0.233 1.000           
Liquidity -0.152 -0.275 -0.321 0.016 0.003 -0.182 -0.273 -0.327 1.000          
LLR 0.100 -0.216 -0.256 -0.177 -0.190 -0.044 0.058 -0.298 0.197 1.000         
Equity 0.137 -0.067 0.052 0.221 0.229 0.080 0.133 -0.106 0.236 0.063 1.000        
Size -0.351 0.520 0.424 0.451 0.446 0.268 0.108 0.327 -0.288 -0.172 -0.252 1.000       
ROA 0.115 0.606 0.516 0.220 0.254 0.096 0.235 0.642 -0.232 -0.334 0.127 0.342 1.000      
Listed 0.103 0.040 0.024 -0.026 -0.005 -0.251 0.008 0.065 0.261 -0.026 0.157 -0.171 0.107 1.000     
Inflation 0.247 -0.054 0.069 -0.101 -0.096 0.030 0.326 0.058 0.040 0.067 0.074 -0.156 0.074 0.275 1.000    
HHI 0.007 0.232 0.229 0.247 0.261 -0.093 0.199 0.002 0.130 0.117 0.320 -0.103 0.198 0.115 0.059 1.000   
GGDP 0.087 0.027 -0.045 -0.083 -0.089 -0.138 -0.045 0.131 -0.074 -0.026 -0.103 -0.036 0.038 -0.069 0.184 -0.179 1.000  
Interest 0.441 -0.177 -0.088 -0.483 -0.470 -0.002 0.406 0.002 -0.150 0.110 -0.117 -0.413 -0.069 0.019 0.406 -0.115 -0.034 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Table B3. Correlation matrix of conventional banks’ sub-sample. 
 
 
Deposit 
rate Lerner LernerIB LernerCB LernerMKT HighShareIB HighMPOP ROE Liquidity LLR Equity Size ROA Listed Inflation HHI GGDP Interest 
 
Deposit rate 1.000                   
Lerner -0.377 1.000                  
LernerIB 0.060 0.269 1.000                 
Lerner CB -0.285 0.479 0.399 1.000                
LernerMKT -0.273 0.464 0.415 0.986 1.000               
HighShareIB 0.017 0.160 0.326 0.257 0.222 1.000              
HighMPOP 0.244 0.070 0.591 0.175 0.186 0.195 1.000             
ROE 0.013 0.444 0.203 0.134 0.138 -0.041 0.087 1.000            
Liquidity -0.145 -0.023 -0.197 -0.097 -0.125 -0.096 -0.172 -0.064 1.000           
LLR 0.035 -0.092 0.156 -0.049 -0.059 0.148 0.190 -0.265 0.153 1.000          
Equity 0.008 0.125 0.204 0.139 0.146 0.050 0.111 -0.024 0.121 0.117 1.000         
Size -0.255 0.208 -0.142 -0.014 -0.025 0.043 -0.128 0.096 -0.183 -0.214 -0.455 1.000        
ROA -0.029 0.573 0.255 0.191 0.200 -0.009 0.111 0.760 -0.059 -0.240 0.197 -0.004 1.000       
Listed 0.055 -0.021 -0.130 -0.013 -0.005 -0.178 -0.035 0.041 0.132 0.081 -0.033 -0.029 -0.003 1.000      
Inflation 0.238 -0.043 0.256 -0.007 -0.002 0.047 0.337 0.066 -0.092 0.122 0.082 -0.180 0.097 0.230 1.000     
HHI -0.167 0.093 0.061 0.048 0.046 -0.108 0.002 0.012 0.221 0.172 -0.002 0.002 0.017 0.189 -0.030 1.000    
GGDP 0.075 0.034 0.228 0.066 0.068 -0.080 0.232 0.132 -0.061 -0.060 0.112 -0.148 0.145 -0.042 0.174 -0.151 1.000   
Interest 0.580 -0.182 0.301 -0.268 -0.265 0.098 0.435 0.112 -0.129 0.196 0.055 -0.308 0.126 -0.028 0.446 -0.165 0.083 1.000  
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Table 1. Banking sector structure in sample countries 
 
Country IB CB ShareIB (%) MPOP (%) LernerIB LernerCB LernerMKT Inflation GGDP HHI 
Bahrain 6 9 20.80 70.30 0.230 0.248 0.239 0.066 -0.002 0.188 
Bangladesh 7 33 16.39 89.50 0.195 0.164 0.171 0.059 0.043 0.114 
Egypt 3 21 6.53 90.00 0.139 0.118 0.119 0.088 0.022 0.149 
Indonesia 7 66 1.30 87.20 0.139 0.261 0.259 0.105 0.040 0.102 
Iraq 1 5 24.30 99.00 0.311 0.260 0.261 0.116 0.023 0.361 
Jordan 3 10 7.52 97.20 0.246 0.271 0.270 0.050 0.029 0.389 
Kenya 2 30 0.80 11.10 0.063 0.309 0.308 0.080 0.017 0.117 
Kuwait 5 5 39.02 76.70 0.325 0.491 0.426 0.082 -0.002 0.193 
Malaysia 19 28 12.68 61.30 0.190 0.309 0.300 0.036 0.033 0.093 
Mauritania 1 3 14.09 100.00 0.337 0.264 0.254 0.069 0.020 0.191 
Pakistan 9 23 14.70 96.40 0.254 0.220 0.224 0.110 0.020 0.151 
Qatar 5 6 16.05 77.50 0.533 0.464 0.472 0.080 0.016 0.279 
Saudi Arabia 5 7 38.41 99.00 0.463 0.524 0.500 0.058 0.025 0.116 
South Africa 1 16 0.14 1.50 0.086 0.205 0.205 0.072 0.016 0.298 
Sudan 4 1 72.06 99.00 0.159 0.239 0.216 0.148 0.040 0.335 
Tunisia 1 10 6.96 99.10 0.262 0.280 0.288 0.036 0.026 0.149 
Turkey 4 26 4.27 99.80 0.199 0.099 0.100 0.167 0.030 0.167 
United Arab Emirates 10 17 17.35 76.00 0.322 0.456 0.433 0.065 -0.028 0.102 
United Kingdom 3 66 0.01 4.40 -0.552 0.211 0.211 0.023 0.012 0.127 
Yemen 2 4 28.04 99.10 0.325 0.337 0.213 0.119 -0.002 0.268 
Total 98 386         
Average     18.27 76.71 0.231 0.291 0.278 0.082 0.019 0.194 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 All sample Islamic banks Conventional banks 
Diff. 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. 
Deposit rate 2,869 0.042 0.034 0.000 0.245 525 0.038 0.035 2,344 0.042 0.033 -2.482** 
Lerner 2,779 0.252 0.215 -0.751 0.694 499 0.245 0.251 2,280 0.254 0.207 -0.845 
ROE 2,869 0.100 0.137 -0.702 0.535 525 0.091 0.130 2,344 0.102 0.138 -1.668 
Liquidity 2,868 0.246 0.159 0.060 0.790 525 0.240 0.143 2,343 0.247 0.162 -0.914 
LLR 2,841 0.051 0.065 0.001 0.460 518 0.050 0.072 2,323 0.051 0.064 -0.314 
Equity 2,869 0.124 0.070 0.037 0.501 525 0.137 0.090 2,344 0.121 0.064 4.769*** 
Size 2,869 22,400 67,400 16.361 436,000 525 7,752 14,200 2,344 25,700 73,900 -5.541*** 
Listed 2,869 0.646 0.478 0.000 1.000 525 0.604 0.490 2,344 0.655 0.476 -2.207*** 
Note: The last column reports t-statistics of mean equality test between Islamic and conventional banks. *** and ** indicate 
significance at 1% and 5% respectively.  
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Table 3. Determinants of Islamic and conventional banks’ deposit rate setting behavior 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (1) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns (1) to (3)) and 
conventional banks (columns (4) to (6)):   
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where Deposit rateit is our dependent variable, Lernerit, is our measure of banks’ market power, X it–1 is a vector of one-year 
lagged bank-level variables and Zjt a vector of country-level variables. See Table B1 for variable definitions.  
We employ the fixed-effect technique for our estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Robust t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lerner 0.0142  0.0118 -0.0371***  -0.0386*** 
 (0.75)  (0.60) (-5.34)  (-5.48) 
ROE  0.0280** 0.0219*  0.000201 0.00763 
  (2.07) (1.67)  (0.04) (1.49) 
Liquidity -0.00232 0.00352 -0.0000320 -0.0139* -0.0147* -0.0140* 
 (-0.16) (0.27) (-0.00) (-1.81) (-1.78) (-1.84) 
LLR 0.108 0.132** 0.117* -0.0329* -0.0271 -0.0288 
 (1.65) (2.21) (1.73) (-1.86) (-1.54) (-1.62) 
Equity 0.0659 0.0601 0.0634 -0.00994 -0.0192 -0.0119 
 (1.37) (1.35) (1.37) (-0.34) (-0.61) (-0.40) 
Size 0.0152** 0.0127** 0.0132** 0.00988*** 0.0100*** 0.00963*** 
 (2.34) (2.00) (2.07) (4.63) (4.18) (4.48) 
Listed 0.00683 0.00232 0.0437*** 0.0533*** 0.0568*** 0.0523*** 
 (1.63) (0.76) (2.75) (7.35) (7.95) (7.03) 
Inflation 0.0303* 0.0155 0.0293* 0.0168*** 0.0161** 0.0166*** 
 (1.88) (0.91) (1.78) (3.10) (2.43) (3.06) 
HHI 0.0887 0.0945 0.0921 -0.0443* -0.0241 -0.0447** 
 (1.22) (1.25) (1.25) (-1.95) (-0.84) (-1.99) 
GGDP -0.00714 -0.00155 -0.00940 -0.0198 -0.0279** -0.0210* 
 (-0.31) (-0.07) (-0.41) (-1.63) (-2.13) (-1.71) 
Constant -0.231** -0.188* -0.197* -0.0963*** -0.109*** -0.0924*** 
 (-2.04) (-1.74) (-1.82) (-2.77) (-2.85) (-2.64) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 500 525 499 2281 2344 2280 
N Banks. 96 98 96 380 386 380 
R-Squared 0.240 0.229 0.247 0.310 0.249 0.311 
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Table 4A. Bank market power and Islamic presence 
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (2) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns (1) to (3)) and conventional 
banks (columns (4) to (6)): 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  where Deposit rateit is our dependent variable, Lernerit, is our measure of banks’ 
market power, X it–1 is a vector of one-year lagged bank-level variables and Zjt a vector of country-level variables. Islamic presence 
measures the strength of Islamic presence in country j. We use two different measures to capture the extent of Islamic presence: 
HighMPOPj or HighShareIBjt. HighShareIB is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the market share of Islamic banks in 
country j at time t is above the sample mean and zero otherwise. HighMPOP is a dummy variable that takes the value of one is the 
share of Muslim population in country j is above the sample mean and zero otherwise. In columns (1) and (3), we study the impact 
of HighShareIB and in columns (2) and (4) the impact of HighMPOP. See Table B1 for variable definitions. We employ the fixed-
effect (FE) estimator with standard errors clustered at the bank level for estimations reported in columns (1) and (3). We employ 
Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator with robust jackknife standard errors for estimations reported in columns (2) and (4).  
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lerner 0.0356** 0.0223 -0.0324*** -0.0213*** 
 (2.05) (0.40) (-4.44) (-2.63) 
HighShareIB 0.0265***  0.0111***  
 (3.69)  (3.82)  
Lerner x HighShareIB -0.0532***  -0.0146**  
 (-2.99)  (-1.98)  
HighMPOP  0.0204  0.0313*** 
  (1.18)  (7.24) 
Lerner x HighMPOP  -0.0262  -0.0418*** 
  (-0.44)  (-3.94) 
ROE 0.0191 0.0268* 0.00722 0.0106* 
 (1.47) (1.75) (1.57) (1.94) 
Liquidity 0.00552 -0.00357 -0.0179** -0.0112 
 (0.34) (-0.25) (-2.30) (-1.49) 
LLR 0.106** 0.124 -0.0252 -0.0392** 
 (2.03) (0.96) (-1.41) (-2.21) 
Equity 0.0474 0.0514 -0.0128 -0.0281 
 (1.17) (0.76) (-0.44) (-1.03) 
Size 0.0120* 0.00691 0.00868*** 0.00434** 
 (1.87) (1.06) (4.07) (2.53) 
Listed 0.0445*** 0.00493 0.0579*** 0.0000928 
 (2.84) (1.16) (6.73) (0.08) 
Inflation 0.0164 0.0267 0.0115** 0.0151*** 
 (1.09) (1.52) (2.10) (2.70) 
HHI 0.0897 0.0758 -0.0839*** -0.0525*** 
 (1.41) (0.68) (-3.44) (-2.65) 
GGDP -0.00683 -0.00156 -0.0160 -0.0280** 
 (-0.32) (-0.05) (-1.23) (-2.20) 
Constant -0.191* -0.110 -0.0760** -0.0188 
 (-1.84) (-0.90) (-2.21) (-0.69) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 499 499 2257 2280 
N Banks. 96 96 379 380 
R-Squared 0.296  0.327  
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Table 4B. Impact of Lerner and Islamic presence 
 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β3) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean (columns (1) and (3)) and when Muslim 
population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) 
 -0.0175 -0.0039 -0.047*** -0.063*** 
 (-1.18) (-0.09) (-5.74) (-7.99) 
Impact of Islamic presence (β2 + β3) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean (columns (1) and (3)) and 
when Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) computed at different value of Lerner 
25thpercentile 0.0196*** 0.0169 0.0085*** 0.0238*** 
 (3.38) (1.54) (4.23) (7.30) 
50thpercentile 0.0142*** 0.0143 0.007*** 0.0196*** 
 (2.74) (1.75) (4.00) (6.44) 
75thpercentile 0.0079 0.0111 0.006*** 0.0167*** 
 (1.50) (1.14) (3.43) (5.37) 
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Table 5. Market-level competition and banks’ deposit rate 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (1) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns (1) to (3)) and 
conventional banks (columns (4) to (6)): 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  where Deposit 
rateit is our dependent variable, Lernerjt is a country-level measure of competition, X it–1 is a vector of one-year lagged bank-
level variables and Zjt a vector of country-level variables. See Table B1 for variable definitions. This table reports the impact 
on IBs and CBs deposit rate respectively of competition, in the Islamic banking segment (LernerIBjt) (columns (1) and (4)), in 
the conventional banking segment (LernerCBjt) (columns (2) and (5)) and in the whole banking market (LernerMKTjt) 
(columns (3) and (6)). We employ the fixed-effect technique for our estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LernerIB -0.0270   -0.00516   
 (-1.62)   (-1.03)   
LernerCB  -0.0376   -0.0421***  
  (-1.45)   (-3.29)  
LernerMKT   -0.0342   -0.0454*** 
   (-1.63)   (-3.87) 
ROE 0.0310** 0.0274** 0.0286** -0.00153 0.000947 0.00114 
 (2.30) (2.08) (2.17) (-0.32) (0.19) (0.23) 
Liquidity 0.00389 0.00627 0.00444 -0.0177** -0.0158* -0.0169** 
 (0.30) (0.48) (0.33) (-2.02) (-1.90) (-2.07) 
LLR 0.135** 0.126** 0.130** -0.0182 -0.0287 -0.0271 
 (2.37) (2.03) (2.17) (-1.06) (-1.57) (-1.48) 
Equity 0.0550 0.0627 0.0608 -0.0105 -0.0203 -0.0195 
 (1.26) (1.41) (1.37) (-0.33) (-0.63) (-0.61) 
Size 0.0118* 0.0123* 0.0121* 0.00917*** 0.0105*** 0.0106*** 
 (1.93) (1.89) (1.87) (3.91) (4.31) (4.32) 
Listed 0.00186 0.0223 0.00195 0.0571*** 0.0510*** 0.0507*** 
 (0.59) (1.58) (0.64) (7.41) (5.84) (5.95) 
Inflation 0.0110 0.0148 0.0129 0.0118* 0.0149** 0.0140** 
 (0.64) (0.88) (0.76) (1.75) (2.45) (2.29) 
HHI 0.0929 0.0957 0.0976 -0.0502 -0.0335 -0.0335 
 (1.23) (1.24) (1.30) (-1.58) (-1.16) (-1.15) 
GGDP 0.00133 0.0134 0.00900 -0.0390*** -0.0174 -0.0182 
 (0.06) (0.56) (0.40) (-2.78) (-1.32) (-1.39) 
Constant -0.166 -0.170 -0.168 -0.0924** -0.102** -0.103** 
 (-1.59) (-1.51) (-1.51) (-2.51) (-2.49) (-2.52) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 524 517 524 2278 2338 2338 
N Banks. 97 97 97 384 386 386 
R-Squared 0.236 0.232 0.234 0.270 0.257 0.258 
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Table 6A. Islamic and conventional banking segment competition and Islamic presence 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (2) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns (1) to (4)) and conventional 
banks (columns (5) to (8)): 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where Deposit rateit is our dependent variable, Lernerit, is a country-level measure of 
competition, X it–1 is a vector of one-year lagged bank-level variables and Zjt a vector of country-level variables. Islamic presence 
measures the strength of Islamic presence in country j. We use two different measures to capture the extent of Islamic presence: 
HighMPOPj or HighShareIBjt. HighShareIB is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the market share of Islamic banks in 
country j at time t is above the sample mean and zero otherwise. HighMPOP is a dummy variable that takes the value of one is the 
share of Muslim population in country j is above the sample mean and zero otherwise. Control: other control variables presented in 
section 2.1. See Table B1 for variable definitions. 
This table reports the impact on IBs and CBs deposit rate respectively of competition, in the Islamic segment (LernerIBjt) (columns 
(1) and (2) and (5)) and (6)) and in the conventional segment (LernerCBjt) (columns (3) and (4) and (7) and (8)). 
We employ the fixed-effect (FE) estimator with standard errors clustered at the bank level for estimations reported in columns (1), 
(3), (5) and (7). We employ Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator with robust jackknife standard errors for estimations reported in 
columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.  
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LernerIB -0.0113 -0.00896   0.00132 0.00118   
 (-0.47) (-0.51)   (0.27) (0.21)   
LernerIB x HighShareIB -0.0225    -0.025***    
 (-1.18)    (-3.04)    
LernerIB x HighMPOP  -0.0590**    -0.039***   
   (-2.33)    (-4.35)   
LernerCB   -0.0142 -0.0759*   -0.044*** -0.0312** 
   (-0.41) (-1.97)   (-3.21) (-2.24) 
LernerCB x HighShareIB   -0.0261    0.00943  
   (-0.96)    (0.71)  
LernerCB x HighMPOP    0.0120    -0.0358** 
     (0.25)    (-2.30) 
HighShareIB 0.0152*  0.0185*  0.0164***  0.00467  
 (1.97)  (1.96)  (5.84)  (1.02)  
HighMPOP  0.0337***  0.00907  0.0285***  0.0310*** 
  (4.24)  (0.50)  (7.11)  (5.20) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.152 -0.0743 -0.153 -0.0724 -0.0927** -0.0184 -0.0779* -0.0321 
  (-1.46) (-0.65) (-1.37) (-0.57) (-2.49) (-0.56) (-1.90) (-0.89) 
N Obs. 524 524 517 517 2278 2278 2312 2338 
N Banks. 97 97 97 97 384 384 385 386 
R-Squared 0.249  0.246  0.280  0.269  
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Table 6B. The impact of Lerner and Islamic presence 
 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β3) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean (columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)) and when 
Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)) 
 -0.033*** -0.067*** -0.0402* -0.0638* -0.023*** -0.038*** -0.0348** -0.067*** 
 (-2.74) (-2.95) (-1.80) (-1.81) (-2.68) (-4.77) (-2.19) (-4.81) 
Impact of Islamic presence (β2 + β3)  (columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean and 
when Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)) computed at different value of Lerner 
25thpercentile 0.0122** 0.0260*** 0.0137** 0.0112 0.0131*** 0.0233*** 0.0063** 0.0245*** 
 (2.13) (4.06) (2.39) (1.05) (6.38) (6.23) (2.4) (5.95) 
50thpercentile 0.0100** 0.0201*** 0.0111** 0.0124 0.0106*** 0.0193*** 0.0073*** 0.0209*** 
 (2.17) (3.23) (2.34) (1.66) (6.13) (5.11) (3.57) (5.72) 
75thpercentile 0.0073* 0.0130* 0.0933* 0.0132** 0.0076*** 0.0145*** 0.0079*** 0.0184*** 
 (1.81) (1.79) (1.90) (2.04) (4.16) (3.54) (3.84) (4.96) 
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Table 7. Impact of the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (3) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (column (1)) and conventional 
banks (column (2)): 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where Deposit rateit is our dependent variable, Lernerit, is our measure of banks’ market power, Crisis is a dummy variable 
which equals one during the financial crisis period (2007 and 2008) and zero otherwise. X it–1 is a vector of one-year lagged 
bank-level variables and Zjt a vector of country-level variables. See Table B1 for variable definitions.  
We employ the fixed-effect (FE) estimator with standard errors clustered at the bank-level. Robust z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) 
Lerner 0.0129 -0.0355*** 
 (0.66) (-4.99) 
Crisis -0.0140 -0.0164*** 
 (-1.03) (-2.75) 
Lerner x Crisis -0.00849 -0.0184* 
 (-0.84) (-1.96) 
ROE 0.0225* 0.00785 
 (1.70) (1.53) 
Liquidity 0.0000991 -0.0140* 
 (0.01) (-1.85) 
LLR 0.121* -0.0291 
 (1.83) (-1.61) 
Equity 0.0623 -0.0150 
 (1.34) (-0.50) 
Size 0.0132** 0.00931*** 
 (2.06) (4.36) 
Listed 0.0437*** 0.0521*** 
 (2.75) (6.87) 
Inflation 0.0322* 0.0213*** 
 (1.86) (3.76) 
HHI 0.0907 -0.0434* 
 (1.23) (-1.89) 
GGDP -0.0105 -0.0254** 
 (-0.45) (-2.09) 
Constant -0.197* -0.0883** 
 (-1.83) (-2.53) 
Time effects Yes Yes 
N Obs 499 2280 
N Banks 96 380 
R-squared 0.249 0.316 
Impact of Lerner during the crisis period (β1+ β3) 0.0044 -0.0539*** 
 (0.20) (-4.19) 
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Table 8. Reaction of Islamic and conventional banks to competitive conditions in the other market segment 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equations (4) and (5) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (column (1)) and 
conventional banks (column (2)): 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 + 𝛽2  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐶𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐼𝐵 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐶𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 + 𝛽2  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝐵 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where Deposit rateIBit is the deposit rate of Islamic banks, Deposit rateCBit is the deposit rate of conventional banks, LernerIBjt 
is a measure of competition in the Islamic banks’ market, LernerCBjt is a measure of competition in the conventional banks’ 
market, X it–1 is a vector of one-year lagged bank-level variables and Zjt a vector of country-level variables. HighLernerIBjt is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the value of LernerIBjt in country j at time t is above the sample mean and zero 
otherwise. HighLernerCBjt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the value of LernerCBjt in country j at time t is 
above the sample mean and zero otherwise. Control: other control variables presented in section 2.1. See Table B1 for variable 
definitions.  
We employ the fixed-effect (FE) estimator with standard errors clustered at the bank-level. Robust z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) 
LernerIB -0.0205  
 (-0.99)  
HighLernerCB -0.00441  
 (-1.00)  
LernerIB x HighLernerCB -0.00734  
 (-0.38)  
LernerCB  -0.0447*** 
  (-3.05) 
HighLernerIB  -0.0106*** 
  (-3.06) 
LernerCB x HighLernerIB  0.0313*** 
  (3.04) 
Constant -0.155 -0.0881** 
 (-1.49) (-2.16) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes 
N Obs. 517 2278 
N Banks 97 384 
R-squared 0.240 0.280 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β2) when the competition in the conventional banking 
segment is low (column (1)) and when the competition in the Islamic 
banking segment is low (column (2)) 
 -0.0278 -0.01337 
  (-1.42) (-0.78) 
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Table 9A. Impact of market interest rate 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equations (1) and (2) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns (1) to (3)) and 
conventional banks (columns (4) to (6)), when we replace inflation by market (short-term) interest rates: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where Deposit rateit is our dependent variable, Lernerit, is our measure of banks’ market power, X it–1 is a vector of one-year 
lagged bank-level variables and Zjt a vector of country-level variables. Islamic presence measures the strength of Islamic 
presence in country j. We use two different measures to capture the extent of Islamic presence: HighMPOPj or HighShareIBjt. 
HighShareIB is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the market share of Islamic banks in country j at time t is above 
the sample mean and zero otherwise. HighMPOP is a dummy variable that takes the value of one is the share of Muslim 
population in country j is above the sample mean and zero otherwise. In columns (2) and (5), we study the impact of 
HighShareIB and in columns (3) and (6) the impact of HighMPOP. Control: other control variables presented in section 2.1. 
See Table B1 for variable definitions.  
We employ the fixed-effect (FE) estimator with standard errors clustered at the bank level for estimations reported in columns 
(1), (2), (4) and (5). We employ Hausman-Taylor (HT) with robust jackknife standard errors for estimations reported in 
columns (3) and (6). Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.  
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lerner 0.0207 0.0298 0.0454 -0.0325*** -0.0303*** -0.0219*** 
 (1.11) (1.64) (0.79) (-4.65) (-4.21) (-2.61) 
HighShareIB  0.0126***   0.00205  
  (2.84)   (0.78)  
Lerner x HighShareIB  -0.0284*   -0.0149**  
  (-1.98)   (-2.00)  
HighMPOP   0.00691   0.00726 
   (0.42)   (1.63) 
Lerner x HighMPOP   -0.0460   -0.0264** 
   (-0.81)   (-2.51) 
Interest 0.00304*** 0.00280*** 0.00308*** 0.00404*** 0.00408*** 0.00381*** 
 (5.44) (5.17) (4.54) (11.35) (11.27) (12.87) 
Constant -0.102 -0.104 -0.0389 0.0287 0.0298 0.0470*** 
 (-1.16) (-1.18) (-0.53) (1.23) (1.27) (2.97) 
Control Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 438 438 438 2098 2072 2098 
N Banks 81 81 81 363 361 363 
R-squared 0.260 0.279  0.356 0.359  
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Table 9B. The impact of Lerner and Islamic presence 
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β3) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean (columns (1) and (3)) and when Muslim 
population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) 
 0.0014 -0.0005 
 
0.04522*** -0.0482*** 
 (0.09) (-0.01) (-5.55) (-6.41) 
Impact of Islamic presence (β2 + β3) (columns (1) and (3)) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean and when 
Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) computed at different value of Lerner 
25thpercentile 
 
0.0086 0.00047 -0.0007 0.0022 
 (2.22) (0.04) (-0.49) (0.67) 
50thpercentile 0.00576 -0.0041 -0.0021 -0.0001 
 (1.41) (-0.46) (-1.53) (-0.04) 
75thpercentile 
 
0.0029 -0.0087 -0.0033** -0.0022 
 (0.62) (-0.82) (-2.29) (-0.68) 
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Table 10A. Robustness: Alternative measure of PLS 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equation (1) and (2) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (column (1), (2), and (3)) 
and conventional banks (column (4), (5), and (6)) when replacing ROE by ROA: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where Deposit rateit is our dependent variable, Lernerit, is our measure of banks’ market power, X it–1 is a vector of one-year 
lagged bank-level variables and Zjt a vector of country-level variables. Islamic presence measures the strength of Islamic 
presence in country j. We use two different measures to capture the extent of Islamic presence: HighMPOPj or HighShareIBjt. 
HighShareIB is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the market share of Islamic banks in country j at time t is above 
the sample mean and zero otherwise. HighMPOP is a dummy variable that takes the value of one is the share of Muslim 
population in country j is above the sample mean and zero otherwise. In columns (2) and (5), we study the impact of 
HighShareIB and in columns (3) and (6) the impact of HighMPOP. Control: other control variables presented in section 2.1. 
See Table B1 for variable definitions.  
We employ the fixed-effect (FE) estimator with standard errors clustered at the bank level for estimations reported in columns 
(1), (2), (4) and (5). We employ Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator with robust jackknife standard errors for estimations reported 
in columns (3) and (6). Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.   
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lerner 0.00554 0.0172 0.0128 -0.0381*** -0.0359*** -0.0210*** 
 (0.30) (0.94) (0.26) (-5.23) (-4.94) (-2.59) 
HighShareIB  0.0166***   0.00609***  
  (3.08)   (2.64)  
Lerner x HighShareIB  -0.0305**   -0.00288  
  (-2.22)   (-0.44)  
HighMPOP   0.0183   0.0316*** 
   (1.14)   (7.16) 
Lerner x HighMPOP   -0.0206   -0.0422*** 
   (-0.36)   (-3.86) 
ROA 0.300*** 0.262** 0.303** 0.0379 0.0262 0.0749* 
 (2.87) (2.55) (2.42) (0.85) (0.60) (1.72) 
Constant -0.184* -0.181* -0.101 -0.0949*** -0.0773** -0.0208 
 (-1.68) (-1.71) (-0.81) (-2.70) (-2.27) (-0.76) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs 499 499 499 2280 2257 2280 
N Banks 96 96 96 380 379 380 
R-squared 0.267 0.295  0.310 0.324  
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Table 10B. The impact of Lerner and Islamic presence 
 
  Islamic banks Conventional banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β3) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean (columns (1) and (3)) and when Muslim 
population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) 
 -0.0132 -0.0078 -0.0387*** -0.0631*** 
  (-0.98) (-0.17) (-4.37) (-7.4) 
Impact of Islamic presence (β2 + β3)  (columns (1) and (3)) when Islamic banks market share is above the sample mean and 
when Muslim population is above the sample mean (columns (2) and (4)) computed at different value of Lerner 
25thpercentile 0.0123*** 0.0154 0.0055*** 0.0235*** 
 (2.67) (1.56) (3.18) (7.22) 
50thpercentile 0.0092** 0.01335 0.0052*** 0.0197*** 
 (2.06) (1.69) (3.05) (6.42) 
75thpercentile 0.0062 0.0112 0.0050*** 0.0163*** 
  (1.29) (1.18) (2.68) (5.17) 
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Table 11. Robustness: instrumental variable regression 
 
This table displays the estimation results of Equations (1) and (2) for two sub-samples, Islamic banks (columns (1) and (2)) 
and conventional banks (columns (3) and (4)): 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐵𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where Deposit rateit is our dependent variable, Lernerit, is our measure of banks’ market power, X it–1 is a vector of one-year 
lagged bank-level variables and Zjt a vector of country-level variables. ROEit–1 is considered as endogenous. We instrument 
Xit–1 by ROEit–2, ROE Industry, and market development (the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP per capita). 
HighShareIB is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the market share of Islamic banks in country j at time t is above 
the sample mean and zero otherwise. See Table B1 for variable definitions. We conduct our regressions using the instrumental 
variables technique. We report the Hansen J-Statistics for the validity of our instruments and the Kleinbergen-Paap wald F-
Statistics for the strength of our instruments. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 Islamic banks Conventional banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lerner 0.0106 0.0235 -0.0487*** -0.0441*** 
 (0.66) (1.30) (-6.43) (-5.30) 
HighShareIB  0.0168***  0.00728** 
  (3.84)  (2.47) 
Lerner x HighShareIB  -0.0440***  -0.00812 
  (-3.13)  (-1.07) 
ROE 0.0118 0.0315 0.0547*** 0.0516*** 
 (0.39) (1.10) (4.30) (4.09) 
Liquidity 0.00738 0.00749 -0.0170** -0.0201*** 
 (0.56) (0.54) (-2.56) (-3.02) 
LLR 0.0804** 0.0876** -0.00704 -0.00387 
 (2.17) (2.52) (-0.36) (-0.20) 
Equity 0.0841** 0.0816** -0.0413 -0.0440* 
 (2.28) (2.42) (-1.63) (-1.74) 
Size 0.0162*** 0.0124** 0.00806*** 0.00779*** 
 (2.98) (2.33) (4.59) (4.39) 
Listed 0.0258* 0.0207 0.0248*** 0.0308*** 
 (1.70) (1.34) (5.55) (6.00) 
Inflation 0.0441*** 0.0280** 0.0206*** 0.0147** 
 (2.91) (2.11) (2.93) (2.16) 
HHI 0.254*** 0.260*** -0.0316 -0.0770*** 
 (3.64) (3.83) (-1.60) (-4.01) 
GGDP -0.0359 -0.0322 -0.0238** -0.0199* 
 (-1.26) (-1.14) (-2.05) (-1.78) 
N Obs 413 413 2063 2041 
N Banks 71 71 319 318 
R-squared 0.361 0.396 0.247 0.266 
Hansen J stat (chi-sq.) 0.683 0.09 3.173 4.577 
Hansen J stat (p-value) 0.7106 0.9561 0.2046 0.1014 
KP wald F stat 8.375*** 12.743*** 27.722*** 27.946*** 
Impact of Lerner (β1 + β3) when Islamic bank market share is above the sample mean 
  -0.0205  -0.0522*** 
   (-1.79)  (-6.38) 
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